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Summarv This paper seeks to establish the optimal format for environmental 
agreements, aimed at reduction of environmental damage resulting from export 
commodity production in developing countries. It is argued thatfor commodities with 
low elasticity of demand and few exporting countries agreements on norms and 
standards among producer countries are optimal, while for commodities with high -
elasticities of demand ICREA 's funded by genera! taxes in importing countries are 
optimal. For commodities with low demand elasticity and many exporting countries 
either Standard ICREA 's of general Taxes ICREA 's might be optimal, depending on 
the type ofprojects to befinanced. 
Environmental damage resulting from primary commodity production is an increa-
sing concern in academie literature.1 Several types of ecological damage can be 
distinguished: 
- Abundant use of agrochemicals in cash erop production (soya, tobacco, cotton, tree 
crops). The most important type of agrochemieal pollution is by pesticides, which 
may accumulate in the food chain, may be directly harmful to the labourers who 
cultivate the crops involved2, and can eliminate natural enemies of pests, thereby 
causing what it is meant to prevent: pest outbreaks. 
- Deforestation for agricultural purposes. In general, this will cause soil erosion, 
desertification, loss of top soil, and a climate change (local as well as global). 
- Overfishing. This consists of two parts: Catching to much of the commercial fish 
itself, and fishing methods which result in a large "bycatch" of commercially 
uninteresting species. 
- Environmental damage resulting from mining activities. Several types of ecological 
damage are caused by mining activities: Waste heaps from mining activities, 
pollution with chemicals used in the refinement of the mining products, soil erosion, 
demolition of vegetation. 
- Depletion of the stock of tropical rainforest, resulting from exploitation for tropical 
hardwood production. 
In this paper we will concentrate on ecological damage resulting from export 
1
 See, among others Van Amstel et al. (1986,1987), Barbier (1989), Pearce et al. (1990), and 
Kox and Stellinga (1992). A summary of the available evidence for various types of ecological 
damage and its respective causes is given in Kox et al. (1993) 
2
 Several pest deaths have been reported, especially in cotton production. 
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commodity production in developing countries. This is not meant to imply that 
environmental damage from export commodity production in developed countries 
would be less severe (to the contrary). We focus on developing countries, because a) 
the importance of export earnings from export commodity production and b) severe 
competition in export commodity markets results in less freedom for developing 
countries to choose appropriate environmental policies to eliminate or reduce this 
environmental damage, relative to the freedom in developed countries. To be more 
concrete, we will argue that international agreements are necessary to enable 
developing countries to combat environmental damage from commodity production, 
while this is not necessary for developed countries. 
We will subsequently treat the reasons why environmental problems are not yet 
treated by domestic environmental policy in the producer countries, argue that 
international environmental agreements will be necessary to enable domestic 
environmental policy to treat the problem of environmental damage from commodity 
production, describe the constraints for such an environmental agreement, and 
discuss various possibilities for these environmental agreements. Specifically, in the 
last section we will concentrate on three types of International Commodity Related 
Environmental Agreements (ICREA' s)3, which differ in the funding of environmen-
tal policy: The "Standard" ICREA, which is funded by import taxes in rich consu-
mer countries, a newly proposed type of General Taxes ICREA, which is funded 
from general tax receipts in import countries, which satisfy one condition: the tax 
revenues are not generated by levying an import tax on commodity imports4, and a 
international environmental agreement among producer countries only. 
I Why Remains Environmental Damage from Commodity Production Uncom-
batted? 
We first want to investigate why environmental damage is not combatted by 
domestic environmental policy. The main arguments can be distinguished in political 
factors and economie factors. 
political factors 
In general environmental policy will result in losses for the producer's involved. 
Environmentally sounder production will generally be more expensive than tradi-
3
 The idea and name ICREA is due to Kox, who subsequently developed the idea in a series of 
papers (Kox (1991), (1992), (1993)). To be specific, the subsequent analysis in section I and II is for 
a large part a summary of Kox's research, as is the "Standard" ICREA; the contribution of this paper 
is the idea of General Taxes ICREA, and the comparative analysis of the three types of environmental 
agreements. 
4
 In general funding will therefore be based on a combination of income taxes, corporate taxes, 
etc. 
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tional, polluting production.5 "Normal" environmental policy will therefore result in 
much higher costs and much lower profits for the producers.6 Therefore it is likely 
that producers will mount a lobby to prevent environmental policy, to lower the 
standards applied, etc. In general, such a lobby might be quite effective, as the 
benefits of environmental policy are often spread out over a large population (Take 
as an example reduction of S02 emissions, saving of a forest, etc), who will receive 
small benefits each, so that they will not mount a lobby to get the environmental 
policy accepted. Especially farmers are often able to mount effective lobbies, as 
their number is quite large, and some political parties depend to a large extent on 
their votes and/or donations. 
Political factors are important both in developing and developed countries. It should 
be noted that the importance of political factors might depend on economie conditi-
ons of the market involved. With a high degree of market concentration and low 
elasticity of demand it might be possible to shift the burden of the environmental 
policy from producers to either consumers or producers of inputs, so that in those 
cases a lobby need not be to be expected.7 
economie factors 
Besides political factors, there are several economie factors which may result in 
absence of environmental policy: transboundary environmental damage, international 
competition, and timing of costs and benefits of environmental damage abatement. 
We will discuss each one briefly, after we have first discussed the necessary 
5
 Theoretically, with complete information environmentally sound production should be at least as 
expensive per unit product as the "old" production technique; if not, it would already have been used 
instead of the old, polluting technique. It is possible, however, that environmental policies will force 
producers to accept a new, unknown technology, which may result in lower costs per unit product. 
This seems to have happened with rice production in Indonesia, but is a clear exception to the rule 
that envrionmentally sound production is generally more expensive than the old production techniques. 
6
 Of course, it is possible to conceive subsidy schemes, in which firms are paid for reduction of 
environmental pollution from a given base point level. Such a subsidy scheme may result in higher 
profits. However, several factors limit the use of such type of schemes: 
- It should be possible to measure the amount of pollution from one source; 
- It should be found politically acceptable to pay firms to reduce their pollution levels; in general, this 
type of policy is quite impopular with the general public (See Baumol and Oates (1990), Mitchell and 
Carson (1989)); 
- Even in those cases that profits are not reduced the producers might not like the environmental 
policy, as it will result in a change in competitiveness of various producers. Specifically, environ-
mental policy for cotton production in the USA might favour small producers relative to big 
producers, resulting in protests of the latter, who have more political clout. 
7
 As a notable example, environmental regulation of the palm oil refinement industry has been 
shown to result of income losses of 43% to the producers of palm oil bunches, while the refing 
industry remained quite unaffected. (Khalid and Braden, (1993)) 
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preconditions for environmental policy to be desirable. 
From a theoretical point of view, environmental damage should be combatted to the 
point that the benefits of a further reduction of environmental damage equal the extra 
cost of a further reduction of environmental damage. Global welfare is maximized 
when global marginal costs equal global marginal benefits, while national welfare is 
maximized when national marginal benefits equal national marginal benefits. 
Domestic environmental policy will be oriented to maximizing national welfare 
(given the restrictions mentioned above on lobbies); in general will domestic policies 
be suboptimal globally if any of the three cases mentioned above do apply: 
- transboundary environmental damage 
In this case the benefits of reduction of environmental are partially obtained outside 
the country where the reduction has happened. As domestic policy will only be 
based on national costs and benefits, the policy which maximizes national welfare 
will not maximize global welfare; more specifically, other countries (or its inhabi-
tants) will be willing to pay for a further reduction of environmental damage. 
- timing of costs and benefits of environmental policy. 
As the costs of reduction of environmental damage is incurred instantaneously, while 
benefits will be incurred in future (at least in important cases like the greenhouse 
effect), no environmental measures will be taken if the time preference is too high, 
which may be the case for developing countries (because of a low basic welfare 
level) or myopie policies in general. 
- international competition 
Domestic environmental policies will increase costs of export commodity production, 
which, with highly competitive commodity markets8 will result in a loss of market 
share,9 and consequently, loss of government revenues from export taxes on 
commodity exports and foreign exchange earnings. Export earning from commodity 
exports are a major source of foreign exchange for many developing countries. 
Foreign exchange may be necessary to pay foreign debts, to get international finance 
and/or to finance import of necessary inputs; government revenues may be difficult 
to obtain in other ways than through taxing export commodities. We may conclude 
that commodity production has positive extemalities, which increase the cost of 
unilateral domestic environmental policy, because of the loss in market share 
implied by severe competition. 
8
 See a.o. Islam and Subramanian (1989) 
9
 The underlying idea is that it will not be possible to tax other parts of the economy to finance 
costs of environmentally sounder production, or to compensate for loss in government income from 
export taxes, etc. Again, this is quite plausible for developing countries. 
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The first and last economie factors behind the absence or inadequacy of domestic 
environmental policy strongly suggest that international agreements on domestic 
environmental policy are necessary to implement optimal global environmental 
policy. These international agreements should satisfy the precondition that it will be 
attractive for each participating country to sign the agreement; more specifically, it 
should at least provide positive benefits to the countries who will have to implement 
new domestic environmental policy. The type of international environmental 
agreements involved differ substantially, however: 
Transboundary environmental damage should give rise to agreements between the 
damage producing country (countries) and the countries which are also affected by 
the environmental damage. In principle, the victims could agree to pay a certain 
amount to the polluting country to implement the domestic environmental policy.10 
Observe that with different sources of the environmental damage, it is not necessary 
for the polluting countries to coordinate their actions; it is only necessary for each 
polluting country to sign an agreement with each of the victim countries. 
International competition combined with a high importance of export eamings and/or 
tax eamings for the government require agreements between the environmental 
damage producing countries to implement environmental domestic policy. This will 
increase costs of commodity production in each of the producer countries involved, 
so that implementation of domestic policy will not result in a loss in market sha-
re.11 Observe that here an agreement among the producers countries only is 
required, which contrast sharply with the type of environmental agreements mentio-
ned above. However, each of the countries involved will have a high incentive to 
"free ride"; therefore, participation of commodity importing countries may be 
desirable to provide mechanisms to discourage free-ridership. 
In the rest of the paper we will focus on international environmental agreements 
which are necessary because of high international competition on the commodity 
market involved. 
II Preconditions for International Environmental Agreements. 
Obviously international environmental agreements are no easily attained. Specifical-
ly, some preconditions with respect to potential agreements has to be met. What are 
10
 This is an implemetation of the idea of a Pareto improvement: the victims value the reduction 
in environmental damage higher than the costs involved, while the polluting country (countries) is 
(are) more than compensated for the extra costs implied by the environmental policy. 
11
 However, total exports may decline as a result of general price increases. The main difference 
with unilateral action is that in the latter case the demand for the commodity export of a country 
implementing environmental policy is influenced by the unilateral demand elasticity (as supply curves 
of the other countries do not alter), while in the fonner case demand is influenced by the global 
demand elasticity. 
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these necessary preconditions which should be satisfied for international environmen-
tai agreements to be realizable? 
A. The agreement should satisfy the foreign exchange constraint of developing 
countries. 
Commodity exports account to a large extent for the foreign exchange income of 
developing countries. For low income countries commodity exports accounted for 
73% of all merchandise exports; for lower middle income countries these percentage 
equals 61 %.12 It is not uncommon to find export of one commodity account for 
50% of total exports, so that it is clear that commodity export earning are an 
important source for foreign exchange, necessary to import inputs. Given the cracial 
importance of commodity export earning, it is important that an international 
environmentai agreement should not violate the constraint that export earning should 
not be negatively affected. 
B. The governments of the commodity producing countries should commit themsel-
ves to reduce environmentai damage from commodity production. 
The analysis above shows that international environmentai agreements are necessary 
to enable domestic environmentai policy. However, the national 
governments should implement the environmentai policy, so that it is necessary that 
these are, in principle, willing to set environmentai goals and standards, and enforce 
compliance. 
C. No international free-ridership. 
As abatement of pollution and other environmentai problems and measures to reduce 
environmentai problems resulting from commodity production normally have their 
costs, each producing country has a strong incentive to free ride; i.e. to profit from 
environmentai measures taken in other countries by increasing its market share 
(while its environmentai damage remains unabated). Free riding may take two 
possible forms: Producing countries may not want to sign the agreement, or they 
may not fulfil their obligations under the agreement. The agreement must be robust 
against both types of free riding. 
m Internationa! Environmentai Agreements 
From the analysis above, we see that environmentai problems in export commodity 
production is difficult to combat because of high international competition, which 
will penalize unilateral domestic environmentai policy regarding export commodity 
production in a producing country. We established the need for international 
environmentai agreements to coordinate environmentai policy. We will discuss three 
12
 See Kox (1992) 
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types of international environmental agreements: 
International Agreements on Environmental Norms 
It is conceivable that producer countries will sign an agreement to apply some 
environmental norms on commodity production, like the amount and type of 
pesticides used, waste treatment from mining, BOD of palm oil mill effluents, etc. If 
all producer countries sign this agreement and the agreement is strictly enforced. the 
price of the commodity will rise to compensate for the extra production costs. This . 
internalization is important, because prices should reflect the true opportunity costs 
of scarce resources, providing right incentive structures to consumers. Therefore, 
internalization of environmental costs is one of the objectives agreed upon in Rio de 
Janeiro: 
"National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalizati-
on of environmental costs and the use of economie instruments, 
taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in princi-
ple, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public inte-
rest and without distorting international trade and investment." 
(UN (1992), principle 16) 
In this type of international environmental agreement, no intervention of consumer 
countries is needed. However, observe: 
- It will be difficult to negotiate an international environmental agreement with 
difference in costs of satisfying specific environmental standards. For example, use 
of pesticides depends on the occurrence of pests in the production area. Depending 
on climatic and other factors, some production areas are favoured by relatively few 
pests, while in others the number of pests outbreaks is much larger, given same use 
of pesticides. So the environmental costs of satisfying agreed standards may differ 
greatly between different production areas/countries, so that even with international 
agreements domestic environmental policies may result in loss of market share for 
countries with higher costs of complying with the environmental norm. 
This suggests that this type of environmental agreements may be better implemented 
by setting standards on costs of environmental sounder production, e.g. an agree-
ment that each country will spend $0.20 per kg coffee to reduce the use of pesticides 
in coffee production. 
However, this may also be difficult to negotiate, as the environmental quality in 
some countries will be substantially better than in others. Specifically, the countries 
whose environmental quality is much better than the others will have no incentive to 
sign the agreement; while their competitive position has not deteriorated as a 
consequence of signing the agreement, they could argue that the other production 
countries would have had to apply a more stringent environment policy (based on 
national costs and benefits of environmental policy) in near future, causing a decline 
7 
in the competitive position of the latter. 
Some compromise has to be found between those two extreme types of international 
agreements on enviromnental standards, with less stringent norms for countries in 
which the costs of satisfying enviromnental standards is higher, without making 
these costs completely equal over all producer countries. It should be pointed out 
that this problem is general to all the international enviromnental agreements 
discussed, and does not depend on the particular type of international enviromnental 
agreement under consideration. 
- Even with equal costs of complying with the enviromnental norms, each country 
will have a strong incentive to free ride, to obtain a better competitive position. 
Retaliation by other producer countries is difficult in practice, as their only possibili-
ty to punish the deserter is to break the agreement, and start to produce pollutingly 
again. Quite surprisingly, it is easier for the less important export countries to free 
ride, as their behaviour will have less influence on the other producer countries than 
free riding by the more important producer countries, so that the costs for the "non-
free riders" of breaking the conflict to punish the free rider will be relatively higher 
(relative to the gain of getting the free rider to comply with the agreement once 
again) for small producer countries, than for big producer countries. 
- The agreement will result in higher prices for the commodity involved. Depending 
on the elasticity of demand, this will result in a more or less severe reduction in 
world demand for the commodity involved. With high demand elasticity, the 
producer will incur a relatively high loss in profits, which will result in political 
resistance by the producers. Furthermore, with an elasticity of demand higher than 1 
(in absolute value), the increase in price will result in a reduction in export earnings. 
This will reduce the likelihood that an enviromnental agreement on enviromnental 
norms will be reached among the producer countries; the more so the higher the 
elasticity of demand. 
Summarizing, we find that international agreements on enviromnental standards are a 
possible format for international enviromnental agreements for commodities with low 
elasticity of demand, and few producing countries which are of comparable size, and 
will be easier to reach if the costs of complying with a given enviromnental norm 
are relatively uniform. 
Standard International Commodity Related Enviromnental Agreements 
(Standard-ICREAs) 
The idea of what we have labelled here as "standard-ICREAs" is due to Kox (1991, 
13
 It is necessary to point out that this is a problem for all types of ICREA's discussed in this 
paper, and is not specific for the type of ICREA under consideration. 
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1992). Basically, the structure of a standard-ICREA is as follows: (OECD)14 
importing countries levy an import tax on the specific commodity, which is subse-
quently transferred to an ICREA-Fund. The exporting countries have a right to draw 
funds from the ICREA-Fund depending on the share in total net exports of the 
commodity. However, the right to draw funds is subject to an important condition: It 
* should be demonstrated that the funds drawn from the fund will be used to abate 
environmental damage and/or alter production techniques in order to reduce 
environmental damage resulting from commodity production; specifically this will 
take the form of funds falling free as specific projects are accepted by the direction 
of the ICREA-Fund. 
Before we continue to discuss the pros and cons of this proposal, I want first to 
emphasize a few critical points in the proposal: 
- The proposed ICREA differs fundamentally from the International Commodity 
Agreements in that it does not contain any price support and/or price stabilisation 
components; 
- The ICREA is commodity specific; for example funds from a coffee-ICREA will 
be used to reduce environmental problems from coffee production, while it may not 
be used to reduce environmental damage from cocoa production. 
- The exporting member countries are free in the kind of projects they want to 
implement. In this way the standard-ICREA proposal respects the sovereignty of 
each of the member countries to implement those environmental policies they deern 
best. Some possible candidate projects to be financed from the ICREA-Fund are: 
- Afforestation projects 
- Command and control type of policy measures; the funds may be 
used to compensate the producers within the country for extra costs 
incurred in order to comply with the environmental standards (if 
this is not done, the price will be above the price of a non-member 
exporter) 
- Financing extra costs for producers when market-conform policies 
like emission trading, Pigovian taxes etc. are implemented. 
- Setting up of extension agencies which should provide information 
on alternative, environmentally sounder production techniques. 
- The ICREA-funds will be available only to those member countries whose projects 
are accepted; this is a powerful deterrent for breaking out of a ICREA of the 
Standard type. 
14
 Only rich, developed countries would likely be able and willing to pay the transfers implied by 
this and the following proposal. 
9 
Although the description may seem quite clear, several difficult decisions have to be 
made bef ore a standard-ICREA can be made operational: 
- What norms for environmental conduct should be specified? 
- More important, if a member country has drawn the maximum amount available to 
him from the Fund, but has not yet reached the environmental norms, should its 
government be expected to supply the balance necessary to attain the environmental 
goals?15 
- At what moment should the Funds be made available? At the moment the project is 
approved by the Fund, or at the moment its results become clear and satisfy a 
certain minimum level? The latter option would require the developing countries to 
finance their environmental programme (and only later be payed back), making it 
less attractive to them, taking into account the scarcity of capital in developing 
countries. 
- How do we prevent the scheme from becoming to bureaucratie? As a large range 
of possible projects can be submitted to the Fund for approval, approval procedures 
may take a long time, preventing effective action. 
The main advantages of this type of environmental agreement are: 
- Sovereignty with respect to the environmental policy measures adopted; this may 
be an important factor in negotiations about several possible forms of international 
environmental agreements. Although favourable from the viewpoint of negotiability 
one should realize that this advantage is bought at the cost of economie efficiency; 
see below. 
- Internalization in the price of environmental costs.16 This is potentially an impor-
15
 I think that should be required, in order to promote efficiënt use of the Funds made available 
by the ICREA, and to prevent Funds being transferred to other goals. However, one should realize 
thatthis requirement may adversely affect the producers, as the government may want to compensate 
itself by increasing taxes on the commodity producers. 
16
 In fact, the extra costs are not really internalized, as the import tax is only levied in the 
importing member countries. So the extra costs are internalized only in part of the importing 
countries, while in the producing country end non-member importing countries the extra costs are not 
internalized. As the price increase in those countries should compensate for all extra costs incurred in 
the production of the commodity the price increase in the importing member countries will be too 
high. We can conclude that the prices do not reflect true scarcity of the resources employed in the 
production of the commodity. How much efficiency is lost because of this effect depend on the share 
consumed outside importing member countries and the demand elasticities (both of importing member 
countries and all other consumers). 
Second, true internalization would call for a price increase compensating costs 
incurred to decrease environmental damage, and for a price increase reflecting actual environmental 
damage levels, while in the proposal only the first may be internalized, depending on the exact format 
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tant plus of this type of environmental agreement, and in correspondence with the 
RIO-Declaration cited above. Accordingly, one can imagine that this type of 
environmental agreement will be not to difficult to negotiate. However, whether or 
not internalization will be right taking a purely economie view depends on the type 
of projects implemented; see below. 
- Another significant plus: this type of environmental agreement is quite robust 
against free rider behaviour of member countries (not complying to the agreement), 
as the benefits (payments out of the Fund) are only obtained when specific projects 
are accepted by the Fund. 
However, the scheme proposed has a number of drawbacks: 
Reduction in demand for the commodity involved. 
As extra costs are internalized in the commodity price, the demand for the commodi-
ty will decline. How much demand will decline depends critically on the demand 
elasticity. With a demand elasticity higher than 1, export income will decrease, 
which is disadvantageous to the developing countries. With demand elasticities 
below 1, export income will rise. The latter does not necessarily imply that develop-
ing countries will be enthusiastic about the agreement proposed; though export 
income increases, government income from export taxes will decrease as long as 
demand is not completely inelastic to (global) price increases. Therefore, we may 
expect resistance to the proposed agreement for high demand elasticities, and 
perhaps some resistance to the agreement with demand elasticities between 0 and 1. 
In case of demand elasticities between 0 and 1, the amount of resistance will depend 
on the importance of export taxes on the commodity involved for government 
finance. 
Internalization of extra costs is not always desirable. 
Apart from the above mentioned drawback of a loss of export income, another 
possible drawback of internalization of extra costs is associated with different type of 
projects which could be financed out of the ICREA-Fund. To see this more clearly, 
we can distinguish between different types of projects to be sponsored by the 
ICREA-Fund: 
- Reparation projects, in which damage done to the environment in 
the past is reduced/eliminated, for example by afforestation of 
deforested areas, cleaning of polluted soils, etc. 
- Establishment of extension agencies, which should inform about 
possible cleaner production techniques, which may be as cost-
of the policy implemented. 
11 
effective as polluting production techniques, but are yet unknown to 
the producers. 
- Credit programmes in those cases that environmentally suboptimal 
techniques are used because of lack of credit to buy sufficiënt 
inputs, as may be the case with soil depletion. 
- Command and order types of policy measures or input taxes (in 
which certain types of inputs are taxed to reduce the amount used)-
,
17
 in which restrictions are put on the range of possible producti-
on techniques used. This may take the form of e.g. prohibiting 
certain type of pesticides, or establishing maximum amounts of 
pesticides per ha. The ICREA-Funds are used to compensate for 
the extra costs incurred by the producers. 
- Market conform types of policy measures, in which a price is put 
on pollution (Pigovian taxes, emission trading, subsidies for reduc-
tion of pollution with respect to certain base levels). The ICREA-
Funds are used to compensate for the extra costs incurred by the 
producers. 
From an efficiency viewpoint, it is only desirable that extra costs incurred because 
of projects which implement market conform measures are intemalized, because 
only this type of costs represent the true cost of using scarce resources.18 
To see this more clearly we investigate each type of projects to be sponsored in 
turn. 
- Reparation projects. The costs incurred in this type of projects do not represent 
true opportunity costs of the commodity production, because 
a) reparation of damage done is in general more expensive than preventing damage 
to happen in the first place; 
b) the damage is done in the past, so that extra costs should be intemalized in prices 
of the past (may be by firms to set up a "provision environmental damage repair-
ment costs"), rather than in current prices. 
- Establishment of extension agencies. As in the case above, the relation between 
expenses on extension agencies and opportunity costs of resources is rather loose. 
From a theoretical viewpoint it is difficult to analyze this type of projects, as 
"information" or "knowledge of production techniques" is normally not seen as a 
Or more general, all policy measures which do not use optimal economie instruments. 
However, see the comments in m. 16. 
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resource or produetion factor. Therefore, there is no theory about its opportunity 
price. However, it is not too difficult to envisage situations in which extension 
agencies developed with funds from the ICREA-Fund are only partly involved with 
extension activities on the specific commodity. 
- Establishment of credit programmes. This is a special case, in that the optimal 
production decision would imply less environmental damage than actually occurs. 
Specifically, this type of projects might be proposed in cases where not enough 
inputs are used (e.g. soil depletion), because of financial constraints. Both net 
income and environmental quality might be higher with higher input use, but this 
level can not be attained because the producer lacks the necessary funds. In those 
cases, ICREA-Funds might be used to set up credit programmes, which enable the 
optimum production decision in absence of financial constraints to be reached. 
Observe that (as profit increases) the trae opportunity costs of the commodity have 
been overestimated, so that internalization in the price should imply a price decrea-
se. However, the ICREA induces a price increase, which is subsequently used to set 
up a credit institution, providing the wrong incentives to the consumer. 
- Compensation for extra costs of command and order type policy measures (and 
other, non-optimal economie instruments). 
As pointed out in economie literature (See e.g. Baumol and Oates (1988)) only a 
limited number of economie instruments achieve a certain environmental goal at 
minimal costs. These optimal instruments are Pigovian taxes, subsidies on environ-
mental damage reduction from a specified base level, Coasian Bargaining, and 
emission trading.19 
A corollary of this theorem states that other instruments will generally achieve the 
environmental goal at too high cost.20 Like in the situations above, internalization 
in prices of too high environmental costs will provide wrong incentives too consu-
mers. 
- Compensation for economie efficiënt implemented policies. Only when the policies 
19
 This does not imply, however, that thse instruments can always be used. The reader is referred 
to Baumol and Oates (1990) for an elaborate discussion on the feasibility of various economie 
instruments under different circumstances. 
20
 Again, some reservation is necessary, as it is possible to achieve environmental goals at 
minimum costs by e.g. command and order, if different reduction levels for each firm are established. 
In practice, however the information requirements for the government would be an insurrnountable 
obstacle to an optimal command and control policy; furthermore, it is not likely that firms would 
accept differentiated environmental targets. So in practice, we might expect that command and control 
policy measures will achieve specified environmental goals only at excessive costs. 
Note that the additional costs (relative to optimally efficiënt instruments) associated with taxing of 
inputs might be quite low if reduction of emission levels is too a large extent correlated with the input 
use, as is the case with e.g. use of pesticides. 
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are economie optimally implemented will internalization of extra costs in prices be 
called for, with all the reservation made in the footnotes above still valid. 
Timing of payments and bureaucratie procedures. 
Another potential drawback is the bureaucratie procedure involved in the approval of 
the project. First, it may cost time to get approval for a project, which may make 
efficiënt and timely action difficult in cases of emergencies; second, some 
deadweight costs are involved in the bureaucracy of the fund; third, it may be 
difficult to assess projects for the ICREA-Fund; fourth, payments may be deferred 
until the results of the project are known. 
Efficiency and the use of norms; payment by government. 
In the standard-ICREA the implementation of environmental policy is not specified, 
in that the use of various instruments is free. As discussed above, the same environ-
mental goal may be achieved with different instruments at different costs. The 
danger looms that some countries may try to achieve environmental goals with 
suboptimal instruments.21 For some countries this may imply that this country will 
not be able to achieve the environmental goals it was supposed to achieve, using its 
funds in the ICREA-Fund to the maximum; this may induce this country to ask for 
either: 
a) higher drawing rights in the Fund; or 
b) weaker norms. 
More strongly, this may suggest that countries might implement suboptimal policies, 
in order to achieve either: 
a) higher payments from the Fund; or 
b) a better competitive position. 
To prevent this type of strategie behaviour, we think a necessary condition in the 
ICREA should be that every country needs to satisfy the specified environmental 
goals in order to draw funds from the ICREA-Fund; this implies that in case of 
insufficiënt drawing rights in the Fund, a country should contribute the balance. 
Observe that in order to make this feasible, environmental norms should be speci-
fied; furthermore for some countries uniform environmental norms might be easy to 
satisfy, so that they could make use of less efficiënt instruments. 
21
 For example, they may set up extension agencies which are not only used to promote new 
technologies for the commodity involved, but are also with production of other commodities. 
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Gatt 

compatibility 
Wether ICREA's would be compatible with the GATT rules is not yet completely 
clear. The GATT rules provide some exceptions, which may be used to justify 
ICREA's (to be specific: GATT does contain some exceptions for commodity 
agreements, and exceptions for measures which should protect health and the 
environment), but whether these exceptions can be used for enviromnental agree-
ments implying import taxes is open to some contention.22 
Political acceptability 
Standard-ICREA's call for import levies on commodity imports in importing 
member countries. Apart from the question whether this requirement is compatible 
with existing GATT rules (see above), this requirement tends to reduce the political 
acceptability in "free trade" oriented countries, which tend to view the import taxes 
as an impediment to trade. Although they miss the point that the import taxes (in the 
standard-ICREA context) would be necessary to obtain trade patterns based on true 
comparative advantage23 (and therefore augmenting trade!), this aversion should be 
counted with. 
Furthermore, it is quite possible that developing countries would that ICREA's will 
function as an instrument for protectionism in the rich countries against cheap 
imports from developing countries. 
Conclusion 
The discussion above suggests that standard-ICREAs are a very suitable type of 
agreement under the foliowing conditions: 
a) low demand elasticity; 
b) most (preferably all) production is consumed in the importing member countries; 
c) the policy instruments used are of the efficiënt type; 
d) payments are made to compensate extra costs incurred because of the implemen-
ted policy (e.g. in the form of Pigovian taxes, or costs of emission trading) on a on-
going basis as long as the environmental goal is achieved; this implies that the 
policy, once implemented, is continued in principal to perpetuity, thereby reducing 
22
 See Jackson (1989) for an extensive description of GATT and its rules. In this book, some 
attention is payed to the exception rules whithin the GATT framework, and its potential use for e.g. 
environmental agreements. From the discussion it is clear that possibilities to set up an environmental 
agreement with import levies to alarge extent depend on interpretation of the existing rules; without 
further jurisdiction it is not possible to teil whether the ICREA framework would be compatible with 
the GATT framework. 
23
 Obviously, this is only true when the standard-ICREA is used to implement use of economie 
efficiënt environmental policy instruments) 
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bureaucratie costs of approval procedures; 
e) payments start at announcement of the policy satisfying c) and d), and is cor 
tinued as long as the environmental norms are satisfied (with a start-up period i 
which the goal not yet need to be satisfied) 
General Taxes ICREAs 
The discussion above of standard-ICREAS suggests that an agreement in which 
ICREA-Fund is financed from the proceeds of an import levy might not be a; 
attractive option if demand elasticity for the commodity is high and/or the type o 
projects sponsored are economically suboptimal. This suggests strongly that ICREA 
funded out of general taxes in the importing member countries. 
The type of projects to be sponsored are the same as with the standard-ICREAs; bt 
we will argue in this section that the General Taxes ICREAs are best suited t 
sponsor projects which (need to) make use of suboptimal economie instruments.2 
With high demand elasticity, all type of projects may be sponsored by the ICREA 
Fund. 
How do we propose to relate the funds to imports and exports of the commodity? T 
answer this question, we may first ask the question why any importing countr 
would be interested in participating in the ICREA. First, participation in an ICREJ 
might be explained by charity; sedond, participation in an ICREA might be explai 
ned from self interest. This may take two forms: Either it may ask for compensatio 
for its participation in an ICREA in another context (e.g. political); or, mor 
importantly, the importing country might expect the environmental situation t 
deteriorate further (without active countermeasures), resulting in an situation i 
which counter measures will have to be taken, but at substantially higher cost. B 
participation in an ICREA, it might be possible to pay a lirtle bit now, in order t 
prevent much bigher cost in future. We will concentrate our analysis on the latte 
explanation. 
As importing countries participate in an ICREA to prevent paying more for th 
commodity in the future, it should be clear that the benefits of participation for a 
importing country is directly related with future consumption of the commodity. '. 
we assume static shares in import patterns (each country will have the same share i 
total import in the future as in the present), total benefits of ICREA participation (< 
all importing countries) will be split among the importing countries on basis c 
relative shares in imports. As shares in benefits are based on shares in total impor 
costs should also be shared on basis of total imports; therefore, each country shoul 
contribute to the ICREA-Fund based on its share in imports, resulting in the sarr 
24
 Suboptimal instruments may be used in those cases that efficiënt economie instruments can n 
be used, e.g. because of lack of knowledge by the producers of alternative production technique 
metering problems to determine emission levels, absent markets for inputs and/or credit, restoratk 
of damage inflicted on the environment in the past, etc. 
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Return on Investment (ROI) on ICREA participation. 
In the analysis above we have abstracted from the difficulties resulting from re-
exports. Taking account of re-exports, the proposed from of a General Taxes 
ICREA is as follows: 
First, the total yearly contnbution to the FUND is determined. Each importing 
member country pays contribution to the FUND, based on its share in total net 
imports of the member countries. Contributions are therefore based on net imports, 
and not gross imports. Net imports are determined on basis of gross imports and 
exports (translated in a raw commodity equivalent if necessary). It is important to 
realize that price increases on imports which are subsequently re-exported do not 
represent a cost to the importing country, so that countries should not pay to prevent 
a future increase in price of the re-exported commodity.25 
Drawing rights are distributed on basis of either total exports (in case of developing 
countries, which, as importers, would not be member of the ICREA) or net exports 
(in case of developed countries, which would be member as importer). 
What are the advantages and disadvantages of this approach relative to the Standard-
ICREA? First, on the political level the General Taxes ICREA has some advantages 
over the Standard-ICREA. 
GATT-Compatibility 
The General Taxes ICREA is certainly GATT compatible, as it does not contain any 
impediments to trade or provide domestic producers with unfair competitive 
advantages. This factor is a significant advantage over Standard-ICREA's, of which 
the GATT compatibility is open to contention. 
Impediments to trade 
Above, we discussed the political resistance against standard-ICREA's resulting from 
the observed barriers to trade implied by the proposal. Although the anti-free trade 
argument is not always valid depending on the type of projects sponsored, it is a 
factor which should be taken account of. Again, the fact that General Taxes ICREAs 
do not contain barriers to trade works in its advantages. 
Elasticity of demand 
25
 This may not be completely true, as re-exports are often in processed form. Higher prices 
imply a decline in demand (also for the processed re-exports), so that an importing country may lose 
some of its benefits from processing as the price of the commodity increases. Therefore, importing 
countries will generally obtain a small benefit from preventing a large future price increase, which 
however, will be dwarfed by the other benefits obtained. 
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With high elasticity of demand, the price increase and resulting loss of deman 
(implying loss of foreign exchange income and government receipts to the exportin 
countries) may be an obstacle for a Standard-ICREA. With a General Taxes ICRFJ 
this problem is absent. 
Focusing on allocative efficiency, it is not completely clear which proposal shoul 
be preferred. A lot depends on the type of projects to be fmanced by the Fund. I 
cases that the instruments used are efficiënt (Coasian bargaining, Pigovian taxes 
emission trading, subsidies for pollution reduction from base levels) the internaii 
zation in the commodity prizes of extra costs26 is desirable. In cases of other pro 
jects the situation is not clear; if the costs of the used instrument departs significani 
ly from the costs implied by economie efficiënt instruments the General Taxe 
ICREA might be desirable; otherwise a Standard ICREA might be appropriate. 
Conclusion 
General Taxes ICREA's might be appropriate in either of the following situations: 
- Commodities with high demand elasticities. 
- Commodities with low demand elasticities, for which use of environmental policie 
implemented by non-efficient instruments is necessary. 
Furthermore, General Taxes ICREA's might be a good alternative to Standard 
ICREA's if the latter might prove either: 
a) politically unacceptable; 
b) GATT-incompatible. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have dealt with three types of International Environmental Agree 
ments to reduce environmental damage resulting from commodity production. W 
have argued that agreements on environmental norms and standards might b 
optimal if the commodity involved has a low demand elasticity and is produced b 
only a few producer countries. 
Environmental agreements providing for transfers of Funds an 
requiring participation of importing countries might be necessary if the commodity i 
produced in many countries or is characterised by high demand elasticity. In genen 
these type of ICREA's require establishment of a ICREA-Fund, from which variou 
types of projects can be financed. However, the way the Fund is financed differs: i 
the Standard-ICREA the Fund is financed by import levies in the importing cour 
26
 Again, it should be emphasized that true intemalization of all relevant costs (costs of abatemei 
of environmental damage as well as costs of remaining environmental damage) will only be achieve 
with specially designed instruments. 
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tries, while in the General Taxes ICREA the Fund is established from general 
government income in importing countries. The General Taxes ICREA 's were argued 
to be preferable for commodities with high demand elasticity. 
The arguments are mixed for commodities produced in many 
countries characterised by low demand elasticity. It was argued that political factors 
and GATT compatibility might favour General Taxes ICREA's over Standard-
ICREA's. The allocative (economie) efficiency favours putting restrictions on the 
type of projects to be financed by the ICREA-Fund. Standard ICREA 's are best set 
up when the projects sponsored will consist of establisbing economie efficiënt or 
nearly efficiënt instruments to attain specified environmental norms and standards. 
General Taxes ICREA's are favoured when the projects sponsored do not make use 
of economie efficiënt instruments. Observe, by the way, that both types of agree-
ments are not mutually exclusive; it is entirely conceivable that for one commodity 
simultaneously a Standard-ICREA and General Taxes ICREA is set up. 
How does this translate in practice when we want to design an environmental 
agreement for a specific commodity? 
First, establish the demand elasticity of the commodity. With a high demand 
elasticity, the General Taxes ICREA should be chosen. 
Second, with low demand elasticities establish the number of producing countries 
exporting the commodity. If the number of commodity exporting countries is low, 
we should focus on agreements on norms and standards (without intervention of 
importing countries). 
Third, with low demand elasticity and many exporting countries we should establish 
the type of projects to be sponsored. In general, we would like to make use of 
efficiënt economie instruments, but several factors (information, reparation of 
damage done in the past, absent markets, etc.) may probibit the use of these 
instruments. If we are forced to make use of inefficiënt instruments, General Taxes 
Icreas are called for; otherwise Standard-ICREA's are most attractive. 
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